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Proximate Cause As a Primary Element
of Fraud
Karl P. Seuthe*
T HE NEW YORK CITY BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU reports a 10%
rise in complaints of unfair business practices in 1958. This
allegedly is the first statistical upturn in complaints since 1953.1
The philosopher Hobbes stated in his celebrated book "Levia-
than" that men tend to prey on their fellowmen for their own
gain.2 It is for this reason, primarily, that government and a
judicial system are necessary features of a civilized society-that
these wrongs may be eliminated or controlled.3 The legal cri-
terion by which fraudulent or predatory motivation is judged is
not the "conscience" of the actor. Rather the external manifesta-
tions of conscience constitute the test of this motivation. Con-
duct, rather than subjective thought, is most frequently the
standard or test employed by the community.4
In modern legal systems, conduct is of small significance
unless it has some outward consequence which is actually or
potentially harmful to the actor or others; fraud is such a con-
sequence.
The law of fraud, as presently construed by the courts, is
based in part on the Law Merchant and in part on well estab-
lished parts of the law of torts. The proposed Uniform Com-
mercial Code assumed that the legal standard of interpretation
of commercial contracts should be the mores of the merchant.
Of course, these mores may be contrary to the mores of some
larger or other competing group or class. When such a conflict
does exist, which "law" is the court to apply? "Law is the word
of him that by right has command over others." 5 The law of the
merchant is well established in our American legal system. The
law of fraud, in part, also stems from criminal law. This involves
* B.S., Univ. of Calif. at Los Angeles; investigator-law clerk with law firm
of Sindell, Sindell, Bourne & Disbro; a third year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 New York Times, Feb. 6, 1959, p. 51.
2 Hobbes Leviathan (first published 1651), Everyman's Library Edition.
3 Patterson, Jurisprudence, Men and Ideas of the Law, 31 (1953).
4 Gerseta Corp. v. Wessex-Campbell Silk Co., 3 F. 2d 236 (2d Cir. 1924).
5 Hobbes, supra n. 2.
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application, by Courts, of the stricter (criminal law kind) rules
of evidence and proof.6
Yet if we now are in the area of "Socialization of Law" as de-
scribed by Roscoe Pound, how then can we reconcile the hesi-
tancy of the law of fraud in following principles found in other
torts? The legislatures have seen fit to impose liability without
fault in many areas, as witness workmen's compensation laws.
Yet in the light of these developments the law of fraud is hesi-
tant to follow the same kind of evolution in respect to fraud.
In the area of fraud, perhaps the part slowest to evolve is
the requirement that there must be reasonable reliance by the
person who claims that a fraud has been committed. The law sets
standards to guide courts in determining whether the recipient
has acted reasonably.
Certain basic premises must first be stated, as this paper
hardly intends to expound on the entire area of fraud. We may
start with certain assumptions, for simplicity's sake. That the
communication complained of was untrue, here will not be ques-
tioned. That the representation was material, is not here to be
questioned. That the recipient of the misrepresentation acted,
or refrained from acting, to his detriment, is not here to be
questioned.7 We do not mean to say that the law of fraud is
completely archaic. There are certain instances which display
the interest of courts and government in changing the law gov-
erning some areas of fraud. For example, the courts now seem
inclined to impose liability on public accountants who issue to
the public false statements of the financial worth of companies.
This, withstanding the fact that the communications are not
directly made to the party relying on them.8
The courts have stated, though, that parties may fall into a
class which cannot avail itself, for legal action purposes, of a mis-
representation. 9 The courts have gone so far as to say that, even
6 Ohio Const. Art. VIII, § 15: "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in
any civil action, on mesne or final process, unless in cases of fraud."
Soinski v. Wardaszko, 38 Ohio App. 388, 176 N. E. 460 (1930).
7 Eisner v. Vereinigte Industrie-Betriebe Fuer Den Osten, 61 N. Y. S. 2d
110, affd. 62 N. Y. S. 2d 603, 270 App. Div. 892 (1946).
8 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); also see
Duro Sportswear v. Cogen, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 20, affd. 137 N. Y. S. 2d 829, 285
App. Div. 867 (1954); State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst et al., 27 N. Y. 104,
15 N. E. 2d 416, 120 A. L. R. 1250, noted 39 Col. L. R. 688 (1938). For the
English view see Candler v. Crane, Christmas and Co., 22 K. B. 164 (1951).
And see the notable tendency in S. E. C. regulations as to securities issues;
and also the various "Blue Sky" Laws. See, generally, Oleck, Modern Cor-
poration Law (Vol. 2, 1959).
9 Henry v. Dennis, 95 Me. 24, 49 At. 58, 85 Am. St. Rep. 365 (1901).
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though false representations were made directly to a recipient,
he could not properly rely on them.10
It is in this area that there is little display of human com-
passion. The courts apply the rule that the man has no right
properly to rely on a misrepresentation where he does not dis-
play average intelligence and prudence. 1 The insistence by
courts that a person be reasonable in his reliance sometimes
works harsh results. Where a fraud has been perpetrated by
communication of ideas of such a nature as to contravene natural
laws, one court stated that it was too preposterous to believe
that anyone in the possession of sound judgment should be
allowed to predicate fraud upon a representation of such a
character.1
2
Logically, there is more occasion to extend the protection
of the courts to those who are not capable of exercising the care
and knowledge of a man of average prudence and intelligence.
Surely it is as much a wrong to deceive an ignorant, incompetent,
or gullible person as to deceive a man of average intelligence.
But, for a jury in effect to be allowed to administer an I. Q. test,
or to give substance to a plaintiff's protestation of general igno-
rance, may seem impractical. 13
In the Uniform Sales Act the writers have seen fit to con-
strue a warranty in the deceitful statements of a vendor. But the
damages then lie in contract, not tort.
A jury often doles out harsh justice to a plaintiff where it
cannot understand how a person did indeed rely on a blatant lie,
using their own standards as the basis for the verdict. The de-
termination should turn rather on the statement of the plaintiff
that he did rely subject to proof by the defendant that plaintiff
indeed had knowledge of the fact that there had been misrepre-
sentation. This would tend to hold a plaintiff accountable for
his actual knowledge, not his presumed knowledge.1 4
10 Wells v. Cook, 16 U. S. 67, 88 Am. Dec. 436 (1863); also see McCracken
v. West, 17 Ohio 16 (1948), and Duncan v. Willis, 51 Ohio St. 433 (1894).
11 Fottler v. Moseley, 179 Mass. 295, 60 N. E. 788 (1901); and see Love v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 641 (D. C., Penna. 1951).
12 H. Herschberg Optical Co. v. Machaelson, 95 N. E. 461 (Nebr. 1901).
13 Teter v. Shultz, 39 N. E. 2d 802 (Ind. 1942).
14 The author realizes that the method of jury determination in cases of
minors aged 6-14, and the application of standards of "reasonableness" to
humans without legal incapacities 15 years or older in age, is in conflict
with this discussion of fraud. The author in no way subscribes to the ap-
plication of these standards.
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Intent to defraud, generally, lowers the standards of reason-
ableness for which the plaintiff is accountable. Yet, if a plaintiff
were held accountable to prove intent, in order to justify his
ignorance, we might have a comedy of errors. As Chief Justice
Bryant stated:
The thought of man shall not be tried, for the devil
himself knowes not the thought of man.'5
The primary consideration should be directed to the damage
sustained by the plaintiff, and not to the intent of the defendant. 16
Proving that the communication was made, without the require-
ment that intent to defraud be annexed to the communication,
seems proper and just. Also it would seem more proper to em-
phasize the change of position, and that this change of position
was properly brought about by that communication. The words
"properly brought about" serve to eliminate cases in which plain-
tiffs knowingly take advantage of the benefits of a defendant's
communication which is incorrect and unwittingly made.
This is a theory similar to the concept of causation in tort.
The relation of the parties is taken into important account. The
act complained of must be shown to have been done. The exer-
cise of a proper degree of care by the plaintiff himself must be
shown, and resulting damage must be proved. The plaintiff's con-
duct must not be so entirely unreasonable (in the light of the
information available to him) that the law may properly say
that his loss is truly his own responsibility. Of course the evi-
dence must not show that the plaintiff in actuality did not rely
on, or was not induced by, the defendant's misrepresentation.
Unquestionably the plaintiff is barred from relief from the mo-
ment when actual knowledge of the fact of misrepresentation is
imparted to him.'7 Where there is later renegotiation with the
principal, for example, after prior negotiation with an agent has
been had, this may not be the basis for claiming fraud on the
part of the agent.'8 If the representation is so incredible that
ordinary ignorant people would not believe it, there would be
15 Y. B. 7 Edw. IV, f. 2, pl. 2.
16 Lambert v. Bessey, T. Raym. 421 (1681).
I7 Kiliel v. Motor Haulage Co., 140 N. Y. S. 2d 51, affd. 149 N. Y. S. 2d 224,
1 A. D. 2d 782 (1955).
18 Levin v. Zeeman, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 441 (1949).
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ground for the jury to decide only if the plaintiff actually did
believe and rely.19
Where the plaintiff (e.g., buyer) has caused an inspection
to be made, then he has not the right to claim reliance on state-
ments of the vendor.20 But undoubtedly, where the inspection
was made by a vendee who lacked the educational background
and experience of the vendor, then the vendee may still have
cause to rely on the statements of a vendor who is of superior
education and experience.21 If the vendee hires an expert to in-
spect, he may not avail himself of reliance on the vendor's mis-
representation.22 In some cases it is not incumbent upon the
vendee personally to inspect, and he may properly rely on state-
ments of the vendor.23 Where parties are both guilty of negli-
gence, neither can avail himself of the other party's wrong, as
they are said to be in pari delicto.24 For the purposes of this dis-
cussion, plaintiff can be guilty of contributory negligence. Nor
can a vendee close his eyes to patent facts, and instead rely on
the misrepresentation of a vendor.25 It is simple sense to say that
no rogue should enjoy ill-gotten plunder for the simple reason
that his victim is a fool.
Falsehood of a tortfeasor's representations, rather than the
credulity of his victims, is to be condemned. 26 Proof of the mis-
representation of material facts, made to the plaintiff, where
there was a proper reliance on the misrepresentation, is the crux
of an action of fraud.27 Courts have at times alluded to the proxi-
mate causation theory in regard to fraud, in cases where the
fraud was perpetrated in a situation not directly aimed at the
plaintiff. Thus, where a part of the total effort of the defendant
was to mislead the plaintiff the courts have held this type of ef-
fort to be actionable.28
19 Barndt v. Frederich, 78 Wis. 1, 47 N. W. 6, 11 L. R. A. 199 (1890); also
see Prosser on Torts (2d Ed. 1955).
20 Carpenter v. Hamilton, 18 Cal. App. 2d 69, 62 P. 2d 1397 (1936).
21 Morrow v. Bonebrake, 84 Kan. 724, 115 P. 585 (1911).
22 Davis v. Bayne, 171 Wash. 1, 17 P. 2d 618 (1932).
23 Lewis v. Jewell, 151 Mass. 345, 24 N. E. 52 (1890).
24 Ellis v. Newbrough, 6 N. M. 181, 27 P. 490 (1891).
25 Farr v. Peterson, 91 Wis. 182, 64 N. W. 863 (1895).
26 Morrill v. Madden, 35 Minn. 493, 29 N. W. 193 (1886); Busterud v. Far-
rington, 36 Minn. 320, 31 N. W. 360 (1887); M. St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v.
Chisholm, 55 Minn. 374, 57 N. W. 63 (1893).
27 McBee v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 238 S. W. 2d 685 (Mo. App. 1951).
28 Rosenbluth v. Sackadorf, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 447 (1947).
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The proximate causation theory might be best extended to
the areas where there have been misrepresentations of law. It
is incumbent upon all members of society to know the law, in
theory. It is for this reason that a misrepresentation of the law,
even though intentional, usually is not basis for recovery.
29 Is it
not reasonable that, even in non-fiduciary cases, that a person
may be entitled to act on the assumption that there exists no
intention to cheat or defraud him?30 No one has a right to com-
plain that another has placed too great reliance on the truth of
what he himself has stated.31 The fraudulent vendor cannot
escape liability by asking the court to applaud his guile and to
condemn his victim for credulity.82 Therefore the meaning given
to fraud should be synonymous with "unconscionable" or "in-
equitable." 33
Various tests can be evolved, to apply the proximate causa-
tion theory to this area of tort. The test of whether the plaintiff
did act in reliance on the misrepresentation of the defendant, for
example, would be adequate for a jury to determine. Also, as to
the materiality of the misrepresentation, a test for the jury to
apply would be whether or not the plaintiff would have acted
in the absence of the misrepresentation. These are areas in
which a jury may easily determine the essence of the actions
of the parties. These are areas of contention which, if fully im-
plemented by the courts, would perhaps minimize fraudulent
transactions.
It is easy to say that most people desire a large return on
small investments. But to allow scoundrels to take advantage of
this propensity of mankind is indeed unjust.8 4
The federal government has seen fit to enter the area of
fraud in regard to use of the United States mails to defraud.
35
29 Chamberlain v. Fuller, 9 A. 832 (S. Ct., Vt., 1887).
30 Stallman v. Schwartz, 76 Cal. App. 2d 406, 173 P. 2d 388 (1946); also see
Channel Master Corp. v. Allen Limited Sales Inc., 4 N. Y. 2d 403, 151 N. E.
2d 833 (1958).
31 Togni v. Taminelli, 11 Cal. App. 7, 103 P. 899 (1909); also Bowman v.
McPheeters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 176 P. 2d 745 (1947).
32 Tracy v. Smith, 175 Cal. 161, 165 P. 535 (1917); also see Peter W. Kero
Inc. v. Terminal Const. Corp., 6 N. J. 36, 78 A. 2d 814 (1951).
33 Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank and Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 1 A. 2d 146,
117 A. L. R. 932 (1938).
34 Durland v. U. S., 161 U. S. 306 (1895).
35 Donaldson v. Read Magazine Inc., 68 S. Ct. 591, 333 U. S. 178 (1948).
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It has attempted to protect the trusting as well as the sus-
picious. 3 6 It is time to extend this social philosophy to larger areas
of fraud. This might be done simply by making proximate
causation, rather than reasonableness of reliance, the primary
test of actionable fraud.
36 Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Society, 58 S. Ct. 113,
302 U. S. 112 (1937).
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